A national sample of 600 members of NCSS equally divided among elementary, middle school or junior high, and high school teachers were questioned about how teachers planned to teach the 2000 election and the results of the election. Selected response and short answers questions inquired concerning instructional strategies and the resources teachers and students would use. Responders overwhelmingly indicated their intent to teach about the presidential electoral process and issues while only a few indicted examining local and state elections. Some (...) teachers indicated they were constrained by the curriculum and had insufficient time. The data prior to the election provide baseline information on the teaching of presidential elections, at the time when the Internet was beginning to be used as a teaching tool in social studies classes. This Paper suggests a need for a dialog examining the role of current events and elections in social studies. (shrink)

Middle and high school social studies teachers in 48 states were surveyed to learn if and how they taught about the impeachment of President Clinton. Those who taught about the impeachment felt confident in handling the material and were positive about the experience. Some expressed an obligation to students or a requirement to teach the topic as a necessity of being a teacher of social studies. Most who taught about impeachment stressed the process and legal concepts or made historical comparisons (...) with previous presidential impeachments. Most teachers who chose not to teach about the impeachment did so because the topic was not related to the content emphasis of their course or because they believed the personal issues in the case were not appropriate for the age group they taught. Questions and implication for the social studies curriculum, current issues, and the media are discussed. (shrink)

One of the contemporary results of Germany’s memorial conundrum is the rise of its “counter-monuments”: brazen, painfully self-conscious memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their being. On the former site of Hamburg’s greatest synagogue, at Bornplatz, Margrit Kahl has assembled an intricate mosaic tracing the complex lines of the synagogue’s roof construction: a palimpsest for a building and community that no longer exist. Norbert Radermacher bathes a guilty landscape in Berlin’s Neukölln neighborhood with the inscribed light of (...) its past. Alfred Hrdlicka began a monument in Hamburg to counter—and thereby neutralize—an indestructible Nazi monument nearby. In a suburb of Hamburg, Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz have erected a black pillar against fascism and for peace designed to disappear altogether over time. The very heart of Berlin, former site of the gestapo headquarters, remains a great, gaping wound as politicians, artists, and various committees forever debate the most appropriate memorial for this site.4 4. The long-burning debate surrounding projected memorials, to the Gestapo-Gelände in particular, continues to exemplify both the German memorial conundrum and the state’s painstaking attempts to articulate it. For an excellent documentation of the process, see Topographie des Terrors: Gestapo, SS und Reichssicherheitshauptamt auf dem “Prinz-Albrecht-Gelände,” ed. Reinhard Rürup . For a shorter account, see James E. Young, “The Topography of German Memory,” The Journal of Art 1 : 30. James E. Young is assistant professor of English and Judaic studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the author of Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation and The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning in Europe, Israel, and America , from which this essay is drawn. He is also the curator of “The Art of Memory,” an exhibition at the Jewish Museum of New York. (shrink)

A series of topical philosophy studies aiming to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research.

Although there has been over a century of formal empirical inquiry, parapsychologists have clearly failed to produce a single reliable demonstration of “paranormal,” or “psi,” phenomena. Although many parapsychological research projects have been carried out under what have been described as well-controlled conditions, this does not by itself make a science, for unless and until it can be demonstrated that paranormal phenomena really exist, there is no subject matter around which a science can develop. Indeed, parapsychologists have not even succeeded (...) in developing a reasonable definition of paranormal phenomena that does not involve, or imply, some aspect of mind-body dualism. Moreover, parapsychology has developed several principles (such as the experimenter effect) which can be used to explain away failures, and the use of these principles contributes to making the psi-hypothesis unfalsifiable. The “anything goes” attitude in parapsychology, which seems to lend credence to virtually any “paranormal” claim, serves to weaken the credibility of parapsychological endeavors in the eyes of critics. This general willingness to suspend doubt is another indication that parapsychology is more than the quest to explain anomalous experiences, as is claimed. It is argued in this paper that parapsychological inquiry reflects the attempt to establish the reality of a nonmaterial aspect of human existence, rather than a search for explanations for anomalous phenomena. (shrink)

Should mental health insurance cover only disorders found in DSM‐IV, or should it be extended to treatment for ordinary shyness, unhappiness, and other responses to life's hard knocks?

Current discussions of business ethics usually only consider deontological and utilitarian approaches. What is missing is a discussion of traditional teleology, often referred to as virtue ethics. While deontology and teleology are useful, they both suffer insufficiencies. Traditional teleology, while deontological in many respects, does not object to utilitarian style calculations as long as they are contained within a moral framework that is not utilitarian in its origin. It contains the best of both approaches and can be used to focus (...) on the individual''s role within an organization. More work is needed in exposing students and faculty to traditional teleology and its place in business ethic''s discussions. (shrink)

Let κ denote a regular uncountable cardinal and NS the normal ideal of nonstationary subsets of κ. Our results concern the well-known open question whether NS fails to be κ + -saturated, i.e., are there κ + stationary subsets of κ with pairwise intersections nonstationary? Our first observation is: Theorem. NS is κ + -saturated iff for every normal ideal J on κ there is a stationary set $A \subseteq \kappa$ such that $J = NS \mid A = \{X \subseteq (...) \kappa:X \cap A \in NS\}$. Turning our attention to large cardinals, we extend the usual (weak) Mahlo hierarchy to define "greatly Mahlo" cardinals and obtain the following: Theorem. If κ is greatly Mahlo then NS is not κ + -saturated. Theorem. If κ is ordinal Π 1 1 -indescribable (e.g., weakly compact), ethereal (e.g., subtle), or carries a κ-saturated ideal, then κ is greatly Mahlo. Moreover, there is a stationary set of greatly Mahlo cardinals below any ordinal Π 1 1 -indescribable cardinal. These methods apply to other normal ideals as well; e.g., the subtle ideal on an ineffable cardinal κ is not κ + -saturated. (shrink)

If dominating functions in ω ω are adjoined repeatedly over a model of GCH via a finite-support c.c.c. iteration, then in the resulting generic extension there are no long towers, every well-ordered unbounded family of increasing functions is a scale, and the splitting number s (and hence the distributivity number h) remains at ω 1.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:166 HUME'S INTEREST IN NEWTON AND SCIENCE Many writers have been forced to examine — in their treatments of Hume's knowledge of and acquaintance with scientific theories of his day — the related questions of Hume's knowledge of and acquaintance with Isaac Newton and of the nature and extent of Newtonian influences upon Hume's thinking. Most have concluded that — in some sense — Hume was acquainted with and (...) influenced by Newton's thought in particular and scientific thought in general. The genesis of this paper is the recent point of view put forward by Peter Jones which challenges the many permutations of this almost ritualistic standard line by removing Hume entirely from the Newtonian and the scientific scenes of thought. Jones argues that Hume knew less about Newton and science, and needed to know less about Newton and 2 science, than he believes is required by the above interpretation. Indeed, Jones argues that Hume's fundamental assumptions, which, according to Jones, derive ultimately from a form of Ciceronian humanism, drive a "wedge" between Newton's thought and that of 3 Hume. Even Hume's introductory remarks in the Treatise about his universal "science of man" are, for Jones, a declaration of independence from the materialistic trend (as Jones sees it) of Newtonian 4 science and not, as so many commentators have maintained — however tenuously or strongly evidence for linkage of Hume's project with Newtonian or scientific thought. Jones baldly argues that Hume totally lacked interest in science in general and in Newton and Newtonian science in particular. Following J. H. Burton's observation that Hume's work is surprisingly free from the "opinions" of contemporary scientists, 167 Jones states there is no evidence that Hume ever studied science at the University of Edinburgh or that he "pursued" scientific studies of any formal sort. Regarding Newtonian scientific thought, he emphasizes the paucity of specifically Newtonian scientific textbooks in the early eighteenth century 7 which might have been available for Hume to study and argues that nowhere in Hume's writings is there evidence of precise and detailed knowledge of Newton's science beyond what is available in Q Chamber's Cyclopaedia. Jones acknowledges that, in the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume utilizes a "general version" of Newton's "Regulae Philosophandi" from the beginning of Book III of Newton's Principia. Nevertheless, in Jones' view, Hume's fundamentally humanistic orientation separates him completely from g any Newtonian influence. Finally, according to Jones, Hume does not betray the least bit of knowledge of Newton's mathematics and its role in Newton's experimental methodology. On this evidence Jones grounds his central claim of Hume's "total lack of interest in contemporary science." What references there are to Newton and to science in Hume's works Jones finds "traceable to essentially literary predecessors such as Fontenelle or Montesquieu, or to standard works of theologians ] 2 or free-thinkers." The absence of clearly direct references to what Jones feels are scientific works results both from Hume's "total lack of interest in science" and from his commitment to a form of Ciceronian humanism which is "inimical" to what Jones finds to be the obvious materialistic tendencies of 13 science in the early modern period. Jones' account of the Ciceronian and French contexts of Hume's thought is excellent. But his claim that Hume had no interest whatsoever in science 168 is simply too strong and finally forces us to view science in Hume's day as equivalent to science in our own time, a manifestly anachronistic point of view. Throughout this paper, my argument will be conditioned by my view that Hume's interest in science cannot be separated from his epistemology or his religious scepticism. Hume's interest in science was precisely that of a man of letters of the eighteenth century vitally engaged in determining the proper use of scientific methodology in establishing the limits of the secular science of man once it has 14 been freed from the fetters of theology. Hume's interest in theological and epistemological issues inevitably gave rise to a strong interest on his part in the science of his day and in Newton's contributions... (shrink)

We study various aspects of the size, including the cardinality, of closed unbounded subsets of [λ]<κ, especially when λ = κ+n for n ε ω. The problem is resolved into the study of the size of certain stationary sets. Relative to the existence of an ω1-Erdös cardinal it is shown consistent that ωω3 < ωω13 and every closed unbounded subsetof [ω3]<ω2 has cardinality ωω13. A weakening of the ω1-Erdös property, ω1-remarkability, is defined and shown to be retained under a large (...) class of Easton-like forcings applied to ω1-Erdös cardinals. A class of reverse-Easton forcings preserving α-Erdösness is also described, with special attention to the establishment of □-principles. Article Outline. (shrink)

We study the I-ultrafilters on ω, where I is a collection of subsets of a set X, usually R or ω 1. The I-ultrafilters usually contain the P-points, often as a small proper subset. We study relations between I-ultrafilters for various I, and closure of I-ultrafilters under ultrafilter sums. We consider, but do not settle, the question whether I-ultrafilters always exist.

This paper discusses global corporate citizenship in the twenty-first century. The primary focus is on the responsibility of managementeducators to foster among students an understanding of the causes and consequences of business activitiy that creates organizationalwealth, including the role of stakeholders. The modern corporation is a stakeholder enterprise: stakeholders enable the business to create wealth and require that it distribute wealth appropriately. The stakeholder enterprise model, which has been so economically successful, also implies corporate citizenship responsibilities. The Clarkson Principles are (...) discussed as a means through which educators and managers can better understand and address the challenges of corporate citizenship in the modern world. (shrink)

James E. Bruce explores the relationship between morality and God’s free choices in the thought of Francis Turretin. The first book-length treatment of Turretin’s natural law theory, Rights in the Law provides an important theological backdrop to Early Modern moral and political philosophy. Turretin affirms Thomas Aquinas’s approach to the natural law, calling it the common opinion of the Reformed orthodox, but he develops it, too, by introducing a threefold scheme of right —divine, natural, and positive—to explain how change (...) within the law is possible. For example, God can change the specific day for Sabbath observance from Saturday to Sunday—from positive right—without changing the natural law precept that finite creatures ought to rest. Yet even with respect to the natural law God is still free. God can make a world in which there is no such thing as murder: he can choose not to make a world that contains such a thing as man. What God cannot do is make a murderable man. So God’s free choices determine the natural law insofar as the natural law is constituted by the nature of the things that God has chosen to create. (shrink)

Institutional investors are increasingly becoming active owners through voting their shares and engaging in dialogue with investee companies to improve corporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance. This article applies a model of stakeholder salience to the shareholder context, analysing the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, to determine the factors that are likely to enhance shareholder salience. It is found that a strong business case and the values of the managers of investee companies are likely to be the (...) most important contributors to shareholder salience. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham was an ardent secularist convinced that society could be sustained without the support of religious institutions or beliefs. This is writ large in the commonly neglected books on religion he wrote and published during the last twenty-five years of his life. However his earliest writings on the subject date from the 1770s, when as a young man he first embarked on his calling as a legal theorist and social reformer. From that time on, religion was never far from (...) the centre of his thoughts. In Secular Utilitarianism, James Crimmins illustrates the nature, extent, and depth of Jeremy Bentham's concern with religion, from his Oxford days of first doubts to the middle years of quiet unbelief, and finally, the zealous atheism and secularism of his later life. Dr Crimmins provides an interpretation of Bentham's thought in which his religious views, hitherto of little interest to Bentham scholars, are shown to be integral: on the one hand intimately associated with the metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological principles which gave shape to his system as a whole, and on the other central to the development of his entirely secular view of society. (shrink)

This dissertation presents an objection to Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances, three possible solutions to the objection, evaluations of the solutions, and a sketch of Wittgenstein's approach to the objection. My thesis is that none of the three proposed solutions is satisfactory, but that Wittgenstein can deal with the objection. ;Chapter I presents the Problem of the Under-Determination of Extension, the claim that family resemblances are not enough to explain the extension of a concept, since resemblances may be postulated between (...) cases falling under different concepts. ;Chapters II and III discuss three solutions proposed by commentators on family resemblances. The Basic Predicates Solution claims that points of family resemblance are sufficient conditions, and is incorrect since Wittgenstein denies that one can infer the applicability of a concept based on the presence of a resemblance to an instance of the concept. The Simple Properties Solution claims that only some concepts are family resemblance concepts, and depend upon concepts which are not family resemblance concepts, and is incorrect, since Wittgenstein does not require that family resemblance concepts be reducible to non-family resemblance concepts. The Bi-Directional Determination of Concepts Solution is the claim that a concept is determined by an interaction between facts about cases subsumed under it, and needs and purposes of language-users. This solution is non-Wittgensteinian by ignoring the ramifications of his concepts of grammar and language-games. ;Chapter IV argues that Wittgenstein deals with the original objection by developing new models for understanding language, involving the concepts of grammar and language-games. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic (...) justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology. (shrink)

This study examines the self-reported ethics of both current and future advertising practitioners, and compares their responses to four scenarios and 17 statements on advertising ethics. Stepwise discriminant analysis was used to determine the extent to which both groups applied the classical ethical theory of deontology to the scenarios and statements. Results indicate significant differences between both groups. For example, current advertising practitioners are significantly less likely than future practitioners to apply deontology to decision making. The implications of these results (...) are discussed and suggestions for future research are outlined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.4 (2002) 677-696 [Access article in PDF] Bentham and Hobbes:An Issue of Influence James E. Crimmins Historians of political thought commonly assume that the similarities in the thought of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) are the product of Bentham's reading of Hobbes and infer that Bentham was in a certain sense a disciple of Hobbes. 1 This has been generally (...) true through the past one hundred years of scholarship, from the commentator writing at the end of the nineteenth century who had no doubt that Bentham's "chief ideas and methods are to be found in Hobbes," to the end of the last century when Gerald Postema insisted that Bentham was "a careful student of Hobbes." 2 In between George Sabine argued that Hobbes's political philosophy "affected the whole later history of moral and political thought," but its powerful "positive influence" was most fully felt in the nineteenth century when his ideas were incorporated into the thinking of the utilitarians. 3 The implication of Sabine's comment [End Page 677] was that Hobbes's influence was not always of the positive sort. In other words, if one can conceive of influence being positive then it can also be negative, and Hobbes had just such an influence on many who read him until his ideas became respectable in the hands of Bentham and his associates. 4 John Plamenatz concurred. Bentham, he wrote, "lived in the shadow of Hobbes" and, together with James Mill, came close to "an uncritical acceptance" of Hobbes's doctrines. 5 Because Bentham abandoned Hobbes's "vocabulary" (laws of nature, natural rights, covenant, and so forth) "the difference between them appears so much greater than it is," claimed Plamenatz. But eliminate the troublesome phrases from Hobbes's writings and what remains, save for Hobbes's extravagant fear of anarchy, is strikingly similar to the fundamental political doctrines of Bentham. 6At the heart of the syndrome of ideas that the utilitarians are assumed to have inherited from Hobbes is the belief that the methods of physical science were the proper models for political explanation. 7 William Bluhm wrote that the mechanistic and naturalistic framework in which Hobbes couched his theory was not to be approached in the literature of political theory until Bentham set forth his felicific calculus. Since the time of Hobbes, Bluhm argued, Bentham stands out as the great exception to the history of neglect that has been the general fate of mathematical forms of analysis in the study of politics (until the second half of the twentieth century). 8 Moreover, in postulating man as a rational actor motivated by selfish interest and in suggesting that it is in the interest of the ruler to govern in the majority interest as the best way of preserving his own power, Bluhm argued that Hobbes provided "an interesting echo... of a central Benthamic principle, [and thus] good evidence that Hobbes is the forerunner of Utilitarianism." 9 The views of Sabine, Plamenatz, and Bluhm found an impressive echo in John Bowle's influential Hobbes and his Critics, where Hobbes is described as "a forerunner of the Benthamite school of political thought." 10 It is with this kind of understanding in mind, that W. H. Greenleaf [End Page 678] commented, "it is no accident that the modern revival of interest in Hobbesian ideas is associated with the utilitarians...." 11Oddly, these commentators have remarkably few references to Hobbes in Bentham's writings to work with. This paucity of textual evidence was noted by an early reviewer of the first edition of Bentham's works, who chose rather to speak of the "coincidences" between the thought of Hobbes and Bentham, only pausing to note that such is the "slippery" nature of general reasonings of the kind Hobbes and Bentham attempted that it should not startle us to find one a monarchist and the other a republican. 12 Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that Bentham did read Hobbes and that much of what he read he assimilated into his... (shrink)

An adequate approach to any of Aristotle's qualitative parts of tragedy must be grounded in an understanding of their hierarchical ranking within the Poetics. Any "whole" must present "a certain order in its arrangement of parts" ,1 and in a drama each part is "for the sake of" the one "above" it. Contrary to Rosenstein's formulation, for instance, the Aristotelian view is that character as a form "concretizes" and individualizes thought as matter. Rosenstein's question as to whether "these . . (...) . indeed form a genuine disjunction" should not even arise. By ignoring the hierarchy, and therefore collapsing it, Rosenstein weakens his otherwise sound assertion that tragedy is not philosophy. Such is the result, whether intended or not, of holding that "thought must also be some form or concretization of action, just as plot and character are" . This vocabulary seems to suggest in the end that a tragic work is organized by philosophical "themes." "To understand spoken thought as an object of imitation in this manner is to understand it not merely as a content or object being imitated . . . but as the supposedly valid expression of an interpretation of the doings of the aesthetically worked world generally. . . . Thought in this sense becomes theme" . · 1. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations of Aristotle are from The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon . James E. Ford responds in this essay to Leon Rosenstein's "On Aristotle and Thought in the Drama" . An assistant professor of English at Brigham Young University—Hawaii Campus, he is currently writing on interpretative theory. See also: "Metaphor and Transcendence" by Karsten Harries in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

The Alexandrian emphasis on smallness, elegance, and slightness at the expense of grand themes in major poetic genres was not preciosity for its own sake: although the poetry was written by and for scholars, it had much larger sources than the bibliothecal context in which it was composed. Since the time of the classical poets, much had changed. Earlier Greek poetry was an intimate part of the life of the city-state, written for its religious occasions and performed by its citizens. (...) But eh conquests of Alexander had altered the structure and the boundaries of the Greek world to an astonishing degree. Alexandria, the center of the poetic culture of the new age, was a city that had not even existed at the time of Euripides; it was in Egypt, not in Greece, and was a huge, polyglot community. As immigrants immersed in a new, impersonal, and bureaucratic society, the poets not unreasonably sought out what was small, intimate, and personal in their verses. The heroes of early Greek poetry are larger than life; those of Alexandrian poetry are life-size. They are human, like us; they have a childhood and an old age; they are afraid or in love or caught in a rainstorm. It was simply one way of reducing the world to more manageable dimensions. At the same time, the new world of Alexandria needed a new poetry. To continue writing epics about a mythology that seemed very far away was senseless; it was impossible to recapture either the style or the immediacy of Homer, lyric poetry, or Attic tragedy. The scholar-poets of Alexandria admired the literature of classical Greece; for them Homer was incomparable and inimitable, to be studied—but not to be copied. Far better, then, to find a new voice on a more manageable scale: instead of oral epic, erudite epyllion; instead of lyric, epigram; instead of tragedy, mime. The poets of an urban and unheroic world might long for but could never re-create the grandeur of the past. James E. G. Zetzel is associate professor of classics at Princeton University and editor of the Transactions of the American Philological Association. He is the author of Latin Textual Criticism in Antiquity and, with Anthony T. Grafton and Glenn W. Most, has translated Friedrich August Wolf’s Prolegomena ad Homerum. (shrink)

Dick Popkin and James Force have attended a number of recent conferences where it was apparent that much new and important research was being done in the fields of interpreting Newton's and Spinoza's contributions as biblical scholars and of the relationship between their biblical scholarship and other aspects of their particular philosophies. This collection represents the best current research in this area. It stands alone as the only work to bring together the best current work on these topics. Its (...) primary audience is specialised scholars of the thought of Newton and Spinoza as well as historians of the philosophical ideas of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. (shrink)

Several canonical partition theorems are obtained, including a simultaneous generalization of Neumer's lemma and the Erdos-Rado theorem. The canonical partition relation for infinite cardinals is completely determined, answering a question of Erdos and Rado. Counterexamples are given showing that in several ways these results cannot be improved.

This paper examines the early years of the eighteenth-century scientific periodical Observations sur la physique, sur l'histoire naturelle et sur les arts , or ‘Rozier's Journal’, after François Rozier . Rozier's Journal is seen as a transitional and competing genre for scientific publication directed at shortcomings in the learned society press and in contemporary scientific communications. The evolution of this role is traced as the Journal emerged from the independent press between 1771 and 1773. It is argued that Rozier's Journal, (...) limited to the sciences physiques , marked only a step towards the specialized periodical of the nineteenth century. The professional character of Rozier's intended audience is suggested, and Rozier's unexpectedly close ties to the scientific societies are explored. The Journal is seen to be part of both the old and the new, a unique case in the ancien régime press. (shrink)

It is shown that if ZF is consistent, then so is ZFC + GCH + "There is a graph with cardinality ℵ 2 and chromatic number ℵ 2 such that every subgraph of cardinality ≤ ℵ 1 has chromatic number ≤ ℵ 0 ". This partially answers a question of Erdos and Hajnal.